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IN THE SWREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BLACK DIAMOND ALLIANCE LLC, ) 
) DOCKET NO. 35189-2008 
PlaintiffiRespondent, ) 
vs . 1 
) District Court Case NO. CV- 07-3806 
SHERRY KIMBALL 1 
) 
APPELLANT'S mPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for 
Bonneville County 
Honorable Gregory S. Anderson, District Judge 
I 
I David A. Johnson - ISBN: 33 19 
I 
I Wright, Johnson, Tolson & Wayment, PLLC 
I P.O. Box 52251 
I Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
(208) 535-1000 
- Attorney for Appellant 
Kipp L. Manwaring - ISBN: 3817 
Just Law Office 
38 1 Shoup Avenue 
P.O. Box 50271 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
(208) 523-9106 
Attorney for Respondent 
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David A. Johnson, on behalf of the DefendantIAppellant, Sherry Kimball e m b a l l )  
hereby replies to the Respondent's Brief filed by PlaintifURespondent, Black Diamond Alliance, 
LLC (Black Diamond) as follows: 
INCORRECT STATEMENT OF FACT 
In light of its significance to the outcome of this case, Kimball finds it necessary to 
correct Black Diamond's assertion that Fremont agreed only to "postpone" the trustee's sale. 
(Resp't Br. 2). The record cited (R. 84) by Black Diamond does not support this statement. The 
Affidavit of Sherry KimballT4 filed 2-18-2008 (treated by the District Court Clerk for the 
Record as an Exhibit. R. p. 104.) specifically states that she was told by Fremont that the sale 
was cancelled. In a summary judgment proceeding, the Court must liberally construe facts in the 
existing record in favor of the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences from the 
record in favor of the non-moving party. Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. v. State 147 Idaho 232,207 P.3d 
963, (2009). The citation referenced by Black Diamond on the record, a memorandum decision 
by the District Court stated: "On May 29,2007 Kimball allegedly telephoned Fremont and 
arranged to make a partial payment of $3,000 on the past due balance in exchange for 
cancellation of the trustee's sale on the property. Kimball agreed to pay the remainder of the 
past due amount by June 18,2007." (R. p. 84). (emphasis added) 
ARGUMENT 
1. The District Court erred in concluding sufficient notice was given to Kimball of the 
subsequent sale. 
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In its response, Black Diamond attempts to reform the issue and incorrectly states that 
"Kimball contends Idaho's statutory framework for nonjudicial foreclosure of a deed of trust 
requires the trustee to give the debtor actual notice of apostponed trustee's sale." (Resp't Br. 6). 
This misstates Kimball's position and argument. As advocated in her Appellant's Brief, Kimball 
is not challenging the constitutionality of the statutes related to non-judicial foreclosure. Rather, 
Kimball is challenging the interpretation of this statute by Black Diamond which was accepted 
by the trial court in such a manner that is both against the statutory intent and in a manner that 
would violate constitutional due process requirements. 
While advocating that Idaho Code 5 45-1506(8) is controlling and to the exclusion of all 
other requirements, including notice to the debtor, Black Dianlond references Idaho Code 5 45- 
1506B(3) for the proposition that no further notice is required. (Resp't Br. 8). In making this 
argument, Black Diamond takes a position opposite to what it argued before the trial court, 
wherein it argued that Idaho Code 4 45-1 506(B) should not be applied to the facts of this case. 
(R. pp. 54-55.) This flip-flop in Black Diamond's legal position should be rejected by this Court. 
Idaho Code $45-1506B(3) is relevant only when a bankrhptcy stay has been put in place and the 
stay is lifted prior to the original sales date, the requirements of Idaho Code 4 45-1506(2-6) have 
been met, and if the trustee receives a written request for postponement. Then the postponement 
could be made by announcement at the original tiustee's sale, date and time. In this case, there 
was no stay entered nor was there any written request for postponement. By itself, Idaho Code 5 
45-1506(8) does not support the lack of notice to a debtor. 
BIaclc Diamond was repetitive in its assertion that a stipulation was made, that this was a 
"postponement" not a "cancellation." (Resp't Br. 4, 8, 9) The relevant facts that apply to the this 
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issue and summary judgment are: (1) Kimball was told by Fremont that the sale was cancelled; 
(2) Kimball paid $3,000.00 to Fremont to buy time, until June 18,2007, to come up with the 
money to pay off the mortgage; (3) the trustee instructed the title company to reset the sale to 
June 12,2007 without any notice to Kimball or without her knowing of the new sale date; and 
(4) Fremont sent Kimball a check for $3,000.00 after the trustee's sale. 
Kimball stands by the proposition that if a declaration made at the time and date of the 
original sale rescheduling the trustee's sale for the June 12,2007 was sufficient notice to Kimball 
under the circumstances of this case, Kilnball's ability to challenge is lost. However, for the 
reasons and authority stated in the Appellant's Brief, which were not responded to by Black 
Diamond in its brief, the circumstances of this case dictate that notice should have been given to 
Kimball. 
2. Black Diamond falsely states that due process arguments were not raised below. 
Black Diamond asserts that Kimball is raising new issues on appeal by referencing the 
U.S. and Idaho Constitutions related to due process. Black Diamond specifically references the 
March 6,2008 transcript and apparently asserts that a verbal argument must be raised to preserve 
the appeal, but provides no authority for such proposition. (Resp't Br. p. 9). Again, Black 
Diamond errs in its reasoning. The record herein contains several citatio~ls in which the issues of 
due process and statutory construction are asserted. In particular, this Court is directed to pages 
47-50 of the Record which discusses the non-judicial foreclosure statutory scheme. Some of the 
specific arguments include: 
1. "This provision requires compliance with the Notice and Affidavit provisions for 
even a postponed sale. This certainly makes sense, particularly in light of due 
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process requirements which would be in place before the deprivation of property." 
(R. p. 48) 
2. "Failure to provide notice deprives the debtor reasonable opportunities to protect 
their interest and to litigate their loss." (R p. 50) 
3. "It is incumbent upon a court to give the statute an interpretation that will not in 
effect nullify it." Magnuson v. Idaho State Tax Commission, Idaho 17, 556 P.2d 
1197, 1176 (1997). (R. p. 50) 
In addition Kimball asserted as her second affirmative defense in her Answer that the 
foreclosure sale was not conducted in accordance to Idaho Law. (R. p. 49). This Court should 
reject Black Diamond's argument in this regard. 
3. Black Diamond was not a Good Faith Purchaser. 
Interestingly, Black Diamond does not address the substantial case law and points raised 
by Kimball in her Appellant's Brief. Rather, Black Diamond asserts that a good faith purchaser 
is determined at the time of being the successful bidder (Resp't Br. pp.10-11). This is not the 
law in Idaho. Black Diamond cites Sun Valley Land and Minerals, Inc. v. Burt 123 Idaho 862, 
853 P.2d 607, (Idaho App.,1993) and the 1955 case of Imig v. McDonald, 77 ldaho 3 14,291 
P.2d. 852, (1955) for the proposition that the "critical time" for determining bona fide purchaser 
status is at the time of purchase, not the time of recording. (Resp't Br. p.10) 
Black Diamond cited the following portion of the Sun Valley Land case as follows: "The 
theory behind the rule is to protect innocent purchasers and to allow them to obtain and convey 
unsullied interests." (Resp't Br. p.10). In candor to the Court, the next sentence was not, but 
should have been included: "Generally, a person must take property through a "conveyance" in 
order to be afforded the protective status of a bona tide purchaser." The Idaho Supreme Court 
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goes on to state that a purchaser must record their interest in good faith to be provided protection 
against other's claims. 123 Idaho at 866, 853 P.2d at 61 1. This shows that the time of 
conveyance and recording are relevant to the issue of whether a person qualifies as a bona fide 
purchaser. 
Black Diamond's position is also in conflict with Taylor v. Just, 130 Idaho 137, 59 P.3d 
308 (2008). Although cited by Kimball and is directly on point, Black Diamond fails to discuss 
or distinguish the same. This is particularly puzzling in that the Taylor v. Just case involved the 
same law firm who acted as trustee in this case and is also acting as counsel for Black Diamond 
herein. In Taylor v. Just, the Idaho Supreme Court found that "The doctrine of good faith 
purchaser for value is available to protect title obtained, not to acquire title." Taylor v. Just, 130 
Idaho 137, 142,59 P.3d 308,313 (2008). Black Diamond's silence on this case is a tacit 
admission on their part that Taylor v. Just is on point and controlling. 
4. Attorney Fees are not appropriate on Appeal. 
First, Kimball is optimistic that she will be the prevailing party and if so, attorney fees 
cannot be awarded to Black Diamond. If Kimball does not prevail on this appeal attorney fees 
are still not merited. This was not a commercial transaction nor was this appeal pursued 
frivolously. 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except transactions 
for personal household purposes. I.C. § 12-120(3). As the trial court below declined to do, this 
court should also find that there is no commercial transaction herein. There was no contractual 
privily between the parties (i.e, no transaction) nor was the property commercial in nature. 
Grover v. Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60, 205 P.3d 11 96, 1201 (2009). 
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Idaho Code 5 12-121 is not applicable. Even where a losing party brings an appeal in 
good faith or raises a genuine issue of law, attorney fees are not available under I.C. 3 12-121. 
Edwards v. Edwards, 122 Idaho 963,970, 842 P.2d 299,306 (Ct.App.1992). Higley v. Woodard, 
124 Idaho 53 1,537, 861 P.2d 101, 107 (Idaho App.,1993). Contrary to Black Diamond's 
arguments, there are no clear set of laws to control the circumstances of this case. As noted by 
the Trial Court struggles in reaching a decision: First granting summary judgment, then granting 
a motion to reconsider and then reentering summary judgment, this is indicative of the 
difficulties encountered in the law. 
CONCLUSION 
The safeguards the legislature put in place for non-judicial foreclosure was for reasonable 
protection of the individual property rights in real estate while recognizing the need to allow 
creditors to enforce the contract entered. In doing so, the legistature intended to provide due 
process requirements to allow persons notice and opportunity to perserve these property rights. 
This Court should not condone a beneficiary or trustee to be arbitrarily handle the 
circumstances and procedures of this case. Reasonable notice could and should have been given 
to Kimball. Further, a trustee should not be able to arbitrarily choose who is a good faith 
purchaser such as rejecting the successful bidder in Taylor v. Just, supra and then to convey title 
in this case, with both Black Diamond and the trustee having prior knowledge of the defect. 
July /% 2009. 
- 
David A. ~ o h n g n  
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on July H, 2008, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document, on the person(s) listed below by causing the same to be delivered by the following 
method: 
Name and Address Method of Service 
Charles C. Just 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
JUST LAW OFFICE 
38 1 Shoup Avenue 
PO Box 50271 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Hand Delivered 
7 - APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
